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MARCH-APRIL, 1962
PERPETUITIES- THE RULE APPLIES
TO REMAINDERS OVER TO CHARITIES
Decedent devised the residue of her estate to the Colorado Na-
tional Bank in trust for 25 years for four beneficiaries, each with a
contingent cross remainder in the income of the others. At the end
of this time the principal was to be divided among the beneficiaries,
their survivors or their issue; if no beneficiaries or issue, then to
certain charitable institutions. The court held the bequest to the
beneficiaries valid. However, they declared the interests of the
beneficiaries' issue and of the charities void for violation of the rule
against perpetuities. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21,
353 P.2d 385 (1960).
McCabe restates an orthodox rule-that no interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest.1 Prior to the instant case
the court apparently had adopted a rule codtrary to other jurisdic-
tions.2 It had implied that public charities were absolutely exempt
from the rule. This comment will trace a brief history of the rule
as applied to charities.
The leading case on gifts over from an individual to a charity
was decided in 1923 in Massachusetts. 3 It involved a gift of a deed
of trust, for certain property, to a bank for its use as long as it con-
tinued in existence. It was then to go to a named charity. The court
held that a gift over to a charity on a remote contingency is void
unless the gift in the first instance is also to a charity.4 The court
indicated that charities can form an exception to the rule, but only
in one instance-when the interest is a gift over from another
charity. As was stated in McCabe, this is the only exception. 5
The facts in Ledwith v. Hurst6 were very similar to those in
the instant case. There the decedent's will provided that certain
property was to go to his wife and daughter for life. At the death
of the survivor it was to pass to the daughter's issue and descend-
ants, and if no issue or descendants to a charity. There was no ex-
press provigion that the issue be alive at the time of the testator's
death. As there were no living issue at testator's death, the court
held the bequest void, stating that although an interest may be
created for a charity in perpetuity, the charitable interest cannot
follow a disposition of the property which is invalid for remoteness. 7
In a later Pennsylvania case," the court reiterated this proposi-
tion concluding, "It follows as a matter of course that if the trunk
of the tree falls, the branches fall with it."9
Several courts have been concerned with the problem of post-
ponement of enjoyment, stating that if the interest is vested it is
not subject to the rule, however remote the time when it may come
1 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2 King, Future Interests in Colorado, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123 (1949).
3 Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923).
4 Ibid.
5 143 Colo. 21, 33, 353 P.2d 385, 391 (1960).
6284 Pa. 94, 133 Atl. 315 (1925); see Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. (1186).
7 Id. at 97, 130 Atl. 317.
8 In re Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 Atl. 653 (1937).
9 Id. at 408, 195 At!. 659.
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into possession.10 This postponement of enjoyment withdraws any
interest from the rule's operation. The rule against perpetuities
applies only to interests which vest too remotely.'
The Colorado Supreme Court in the instant case has stated
the rule correctly: "It is true that the court has said on a number
of occasions that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to
charities, but never in a case where the interest of individuals or
non-charitable corporations have intervened.'
2
Previous statements of the rule were misleading because in all
Colorado cases dealing with charities the interests would have been
valid, even if given over to non-charitable organizations or individ-
uals. Clayton v. Hallett,"3 the first Colorado case to mention this
exception, involved a trust in perpetuity for the maintenance of a
college for the education of orphan boys. The reference to the rule
was dictum because it would not have applied even if the interest
had not been given to a charity.1 4 The trust might have violated
other rules15 but not the rule against remote vesting, for the inter-
est was vested.
Haggin v. International Trust Co.' 6 involved an estate which
was to be converted into cash, and then used to erect an ornamental
arch in Denver's Civic Center. All the money was to be paid out
by the executor subject to the approval of certain persons. The
court held that a bequest to a charity was to be given the most lib-
eral construction so that the intent of the donor would be enforced.
It was regarded as the "settled law" in Colorado that the rule
against perpetuities does not include charities.' 7 Again, the court
need not have considered the rule because the case dealt with a
vested gift subject to divestment. It is the "settled law" in every
jurisdiction that a bequest such as this one is out of the scope of
the rule, not because the gift was to a charity but because the gift
was vested.
In Town of Clarion v. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co.,'8 a
provision that the city agree to perpetually maintain a gift of a
memorial library was held to be a condition subsequent. The opin-
ion implied, however, that even without an immediate vesting the
gift would be valid because charitable bequests are not subject to
the rule' 9-again, an inaccurate statement.
A gift of the residue of testator's estate to the Colorado State
Bureau of Child and Animal Protection for its use in perpetuity
was declared valid on the assumption that the court has "many
times held" that the rule does not apply to charities.20 This gift
10 Harrison v. Kamp, 395 Ill. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946); In re Swingle's Estate, 178 Ken. 529, 289
P.2d 778 (1955); Appeal of Appleton, 136 Pa. 354, 20 Ati. 521 (1890); First Huntington Nat'l Bank
v. G.cdeon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W.V. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953).
11 In re Gageby's Estate, 293 Pa. 109, 141 Ati. 842 (1928). See also Gray, op. cit. supra note 2
at 191.
12 Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 33, 353 P.2d 385, 391 (1960).
1:30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac. 429 (1902).
14 Grant, Powers and Perpetuities in Colorado, 10 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249, 252 (1938).
15 Simes & Smith, Low of Future Interests, § 1281 (2d ed. 1956) states: "it may be said that this
[rule against indestructibility of trusts] is but a branch of the rule against perpetuities. But the
present tendency is to treut it as a separate, but closely related doctrine."
t669 Colo. 135, 169 Pac. 138 (1917).
17 Id. at 141, 169 Pac. 138, 141 (1917).
IS 71 Colo. 482, 208 Pac. 251 (1922).
It) Ibid.
20 Johnson v. Colorado State Bureau, 86 Colo. 221, 279 Pac. 721 (1929).
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
was already vested; the only problem involved the duration of the
interest, consideration of the rule by the court was unnecessary.
The first Colorado case to restrict this alleged exception was
Gregory v. Colorado Nat'l Bank.21 There a will directed the trustees,
after making certain investments which could possibly last longer
than 21 years, to pay one-half of the residue to charities and one-
half for the benefit of the city. The problem was resolved on the
theory that although the enjoyment was postponed, the interest
itself was vested.22 The court cited the Clayton case,23 Haggin v.
International Trust Co. 24 and Johnson v. Colorado State Bureau of
Child & Animal Protection25 in support of it declaration that the
rule has no application to public charities. As pointed out above,
all of these cases were decided on specific issues not actually in-
volving the rule against perpetuities. However, the court did cite
Gray 26 to the effect that the rule may apply, even to charities, if
the interest is based on a condition precedent.
In Smith v. United States Nat'l Bank,27 the court was again
thrown into a trap by an advocate postulating the theory that chari-
ties are not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities. There
the problem was merely one of a vested interest with enjoyment
postponed. The rule should have been discussed only to clarify its
correct application.
Since the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the rule
in these cases is not clear, some confusion has existed concerning
the exact effect of the rule upon charities. As pointed out, the pur-
pose of the rule is not to invalidate present interests, but to prevent
the remote vesting of future interests.28 The fact that the future
interest is in favor of a charity in no way eliminates the social in-
convenience. 29 The only exception is in the instance of a gift over
from one charity to another.
The rule against perpetuities has been a source of legal con-
foundment since its inception. As in all rules, we must have excep-
tions to add to the perplexity of the law. Before the decision in the
instant case, few have realized how very narrow the exception is.
Gwen Gregory
21 91 Colo. 172, 13 P.2d 273 (1932).
22 Ibid.
23 Supra note 16.
24 Supra note 18.
25 Supra note 16.
26 Supra note 18 at 177-78, 13 P.2d at 275.
27 120 Colo. 167, 207 P.2d 1194 (1949).
28 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2 at 428.
29 4 Restatement, Property § 396 (1944).
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